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The Comparative Decline
and Revitalization Processes
of Hartford and Detroit
Jane Bisson
To some, Detroit, Michigan and Hartford, Connecticut may simply
appear to be two struggling and impoverished cities with little
potential. However, both cities hold within themselves a thriving
past and strong future potential. Hartford and Detroit are desirable
cities for the comparison of deindustrialization and revitalization
for several reasons. First, their experience with deindustrialization
occurred around the same time period. Detroit is a bit larger than
Hartford, with a population of over 680,000 versus about 126,000.1
However, their similar experiences with deindustrialization, and job
loss due to globalization, as well as similar strategies for urban renewal
make them desirable for comparability. The experiences of Detroit
and Hartford, both similar and different, illustrate the ways in which
cities in the future may prevent or lessen their economic and social
decline. The deindustrialization processes of both cities indicate the
vital importance of an urban economy that thrives off of not one, but
several different bases. Secondly, these case studies illustrate the best
and worst strategies of urban revitalization. Both suggest that the most
successful revitalization strategies are ones that encourage people
to not only visit the city, but also to live there. To do this, projects
must intend to interact with the city in a way that encourages an
integrated experience for both tourist and resident alike. With the goal
of producing a balance of interested tourists and happy residents in
downtown, urban renewal strategies can ultimately produce happier,
stronger and more thriving metropolises.
The Rise and Fall of Detroit and Hartford
In order to understand the goals of urban revitalization, it is
necessary to understand both what the problems are, as well as the roots
of those problems. The histories of both Hartford and Detroit tell a story
of a once thriving city that has since been unable to regain its former
glory. Both cities were once industrial hubs, and both lost their primary
economic base due to increasing cost and international competition.
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Now, both cities have impoverished populations and limited urban
resources. Though the cities differ in several ways, among which
include size, population demographics and urban services, Hartford
and Detroit are two cities in dire need of revitalization. Together their
demises, coupled with their current attempts at urban reinvention,
illustrate strategies for both the prevention of such dramatic erosion
of economic bases, as well as strategies of urban reinvention.
Hartford was once a thriving city that today is struggling to
regain its former glory. Similar to Detroit, Hartford experienced a
boom in industry beginning in the early twentieth century. Large
corporations, such as insurance companies, began to invest in Hartford
and set up large-scale insurance businesses in the area.2 Still today
insurance companies are one of the major jobs providers in Hartford.
Hartford’s workforce as a whole was well educated in manufacturing,
thereby attracting major manufacturing companies such as Pope
Manufacturing, an automobile manufacturer, as well as Royal and
Underwood, both typewriter manufacturers.3 Equally, if not more
importantly to Hartford’s booming industrial age, was the arrival of
Pratt & Whitney, an aerospace manufacturer.4 Pratt and Whitney,
later with another location in East Hartford, became so important
to Hartford’s economy that by World War II it employed more than
25,000 workers.5 Additionally, the Colt Firearms factory provided
manufacturing jobs and contributed to Hartford’s thriving industrial
economy.6 The population of Hartford boomed, attracting immigrants
to fulfill the rising demand for labor in the area. Hartford reached its
highest population during the manufacturing boom after World War II,
rising rapidly from 164,072 to 177,397 between 1940 and 1950.7 By the
1950s, Hartford was a robust industrial powerhouse, providing over
30,000 manufacturing jobs.8 This prosperity was short lived, however,
as the industrial base of Hartford rapidly shrunk, causing the number
of jobs provided by manufacturing to plummet to just 20,000 in 1970.9
Hartford experienced a period of rapid deindustrialization, due
to foreign competition and increasing manufacturing costs. By the
1970s, not only did the number of jobs provided by the manufacturing
industry decline dramatically, the racial demographics of the city also
rapidly changed. New Deal reforms that encouraged the purchasing of
single family homes, white flight and red-lining all caused Caucasian
population of Hartford to drop to just 50 percent by 1970, from 90
percent in 1950.10 Unique to Hartford and very few other cities was the
pattern of continued immigration even with a shrinking pool of jobs. By
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2010, 41 percent of the population of Hartford was Hispanic, illustrating
the continued migration of peoples from Puerto Rico, Jamaica and
other Caribbean islands.11 This wave of immigration alongside rapid
deindustrialization caused major issues for the city, many of which
still persist today. Areas that were once comfortably middle class
and stood adjacent to industrial factories were now neighborhoods of
poor immigrants next to abandoned warehouses.12 Also quite unique
to Hartford was that during this time of mass deindustrialization
and continued migration, the white-collar sector of the city continued
to expand. Notably, the insurance industry remained and even
grew, now offering jobs to an increasingly white and middle class
metropolitan area.13 This gave Hartford an unconventional identity,
one of an increasingly impoverished city with increasingly wealthy
suburbs. In 1990, the United States Census ranked Hartford as the
eighth poorest urban population in the United States, an evaluation
that has not much changed in recent years.14
Today, Hartford is a floundering city in a sea of wealthy suburbs.
Hartford is the most impoverished part of what is otherwise the
wealthiest state in the United States; 30 percent of the residents
of Hartford lived under the poverty line in 2002.15 The city has a
homeownership rate of 24.5 percent, making it the second lowest in the
nation, behind Newark, New Jersey.16 Additionally, Hartford has lost
45 percent of its property-tax base since 1990, causing the city
government to lose a significant portion of its revenues.17 The 17
square mile city is almost covered completely in half by untaxable
property such as parks, churches, academic institutions and
government property.18 Not surprisingly given the minimal amount
of property taxes the city collects, Hartford’s education system is
severely underperforming. Only 12.4 percent of the city’s population
holds a bachelor’s degree, and perhaps even more shockingly, only
61 percent of adults older than 25 have graduated high school.19
Most of the problems that Hartford is currently experiencing can be
traced back to the city’s loss of its major economic base, manufacturing.
However, many point to the state’s lack of county government as
one of the reasons why Hartford has not been able to bounce back
the way many other post-industrial cities have. Because there is no
county government, Hartford must use its own tax base, instead of
being able to benefit from regional taxation and spending that would
incorporate the wealth of the suburbs into Hartford itself. At the
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same time, many still see Hartford’s wealthy suburbs as an advantage
to be utilized in revitalization projects, suggesting that these wealthy
suburbs have the power to transform Hartford into the bustling,
thriving city it once was.
Detroit is perhaps the most well know American example of
extreme deindustrialization and its crippling effects. However, the
city also has a rich history and an industrial legacy that helped shape
its urban form today. In early twentieth century Detroit, there was
an explosion of entrepreneurship in the automotive industry.20 The
city thrived off of this new industry, and the economy of Detroit soon
centered on automobiles. Ford’s assembly lines took over, demanding
only minimum human skill and plummeting production costs. The
assembly line did not just produce cheaper cars; it also produced an
industry that demanded little to no education.21 Not only did this
new assembly line driven industry require less education of the city’s
populace, it also caused the city to lose the small, competitive and
independent firms that once dominated.22 Increasingly, these small
firms gave way to massive corporations that took over the industry. By
1955, the Detroit-Windsor metropolitan area was home to three of the
five largest corporations on the planet.23 Dwindling education levels,
combined with the loss of small, independent firms set Detroit up for
future economic struggles.
Between 1950-1970, under the direction of the “Big Three”
American automotive companies that virtually ran Detroit’s economy,
Detroit was on the rise. In 1955, Detroit was home to three of the five
largest corporations on the planet, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler,
known as the “Big Three”.24 The population of the city peaked at 1.85
million people in the mid twentieth century, and the economy was
booming.25 However, the “Big Three” soon began to falter. As soon as
1980, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler began to close down plants,
shutting down as many as 128 from 1980 to 2012.26 These massive
automobile corporations faltered for several reasons. Globalization is
perhaps the most influential force in the decline of industry in Detroit.
Firstly, the “Big Three” were unable to keep up with the technological
innovation coming from Europe and Japan.27 Also stemming from
global competition were increased production costs, as well as rising
labor and health care costs.28 Detroit also lost many of its automotive
jobs to overseas.29 In 2000, the “Big Three” employed 425,132 people
in the United States and 249,622 people abroad.30 In 2010, the
number of people employed by the “Big Three” in the United States
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had plummeted to 171,200, and the number of people employed
abroad rose marginally to 276,800.31 These numbers illustrate not
only the decline of the “Big Three” globally, but also illustrate the
significant job loss in the United States, concentrated in the DetroitWindsor Metropolitan Area. Additionally, social unrest including
racial tensions and strikes stemming from union negotiations affected
not only the economic performance of the corporations but also
contributed to the rising cost of production.32 It is clear that the
automotive industry is declining, and with it Detroit’s economy is
faltering.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Detroit’s population
declined 24.9 percent.33 The employment rate of residents of the
Detroit metropolitan area also declined by 21.3 percent, including a
52.5 percent decline in manufacturing jobs from 488,000 to
232,000.34 Due to an ineffective government, the city was turned
over to over to Kevyn Orr, a bankruptcy lawyer from Washington,
D.C. who was considered a state-appointed “emergency manager”. 35
Orr, who was not an elected official, was charged with several tasks
to help improve the city’s governance: restructuring the city’s debt,
formulating a new budget, modifying union contracts, and selling
city assets.36 When Orr took over, Detroit had $64 million dollars
in cash but had an outstanding debt of $226 million.37 In July 2013,
the emergency manager and the state governor declared Detroit
bankrupt.38 The emergency manager’s report on the state of Detroit
illustrated just how desperate the city had become. The police
department was deemed “inefficient and ineffective” due to low
response times and case closures, the public transit system failed
to deliver reliable service, the public parks were unkempt and
many headed for closure, and half the street lights in the city were
broken.39 In addition, the number of business establishments in the
city has plummeted, from about 23,500 in 1972 to about 8,300 in
2002.40 The bottom line of the facts and figures illuminating Detroit’s
current state of desperation is the simple truth that there are not
enough jobs in the city, just 27 jobs per 100 residents.41 For this
reason, it is likely the primary goal of revitalization strategies by the
city of Detroit will be to bring more jobs to the area.
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The Puzzle of Urban Reinvention: The Cases of Hartford
and Detroit
An understanding of the history of Detroit and Hartford illuminates
the revitalization strategies each city has chosen to pursue. Both cities
faced major deindustrialization after enjoying an age of prosperity
driven by manufacturing. Now both cities must face their problems
head on: impoverished residents, a shrinking tax base, and minimal
job opportunities for the city residents. Both Hartford and Detroit
have deployed urban reinvention strategies, some similar, some
different. There are several different theories regarding urban
redevelopment. One strategy of reinventing post-industrial cities is
to redevelop the downtown of the city through investment, including
building offices, hotels and entertainment centers.42 However,
this strategy has its critics, who claim that focusing just on driving
investment into the downtown does little to create sustainable
economic growth, causes unequal distribution of resources and does
not provide quality jobs to lift the residents out of poverty.43 Another
strategy is for the city government to formulate policy that attracts
investment, with tools such as tax breaks.44 Yet another strategy is
more indirect, and involves reshaping the governance of the city in
order to reinvigorate the city from the ground up.45 Both Hartford
and Detroit have dabbled in each of these strategies, which represent
just three of many. To varying degrees, the two cities have deployed
projects based on these theories, in the hope that they will spur
revitalization.
In its quest for urban renewal, Detroit has emphasized massive
development projects with the goal that these projects will reconfigure
and renew the fabric of the city. One of the most famous and
prominent of these projects is the Renaissance Center, now called
GM RENCEN. Around 1970, the chairman of Ford Henry Ford II had
the idea to pool the resources of the car manufacturers in Detroit to
help revitalize the city.46 Out of this idea rose Detroit Renaissance, a
non-profit organization made up of 51 major corporations, including
General Motors, Chrysler, American Motors, and B.F. Goodrich, all of
which had substantial economic stake in the prosperity of Detroit.47
Out of this band of corporations rose the idea for the Renaissance
Center, a complex located on the Detroit riverfront. Designed by
architect John Portman, this $337 million dollar complex includes a
group of office buildings, shops and a massive hotel.48 The plans for the
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center included a complex of residential buildings, which were never
completed because the project ran out of funding.49 The idea for the
Renaissance Center was to draw people back into downtown, to shop,
eat at restaurants and spend their entertainment dollars.50 Its designers
wanted to pull people out of the suburbs and into downtown, hoping
that once residents experienced the benefits of the city, people would
move back in from the suburbs, or at least spend more time and money
downtown.51 However, even the driving force behind the center, Henry
Ford II, admitted that the goal was for the project to be “primarily a
catalyst to make other things happen” in downtown Detroit.52
To many, the Renaissance Center represents a failed attempt of
urban renewal in Detroit. Even as the center was under construction,
one of the major criticisms was that the $337 million dollars used to
build the complex should have been spread around Detroit and used
to invest in several smaller projects around the entire city.53 Charles
Blessing, the director of the Detroit City Planning Commission in
the 1970s when the center was being built, criticized the location,
which he argued was isolated from the rest of downtown, isolated
from the buildings near it on the riverfront, and did not flow with the
architecture of the rest of the city.54 These criticisms, as well as many
others, still ring true today. Many condemn the fortress-like feeling
of the center, whose massive parking garages and easy access from
the freeways clearly demonstrate the goal of attracting
suburbanites.55 One of the primary issues of the Renaissance Center
is the fact that it, if anything, simply draws people into downtown
for a short amount of time, to shop or to eat. Many claim that if the
center had included the residential constructions that were originally
planned, the complex may have had much more success.56 Had people
actually lived in and near the center, there may have been more
demand for other businesses to open in the area, possibly slowly
creating an actual rebirth of the downtown. Though the Renaissance
Center by no means represents the consuming rebirth of Detroit it
was meant to, it may still offer a glimmer of hope. The purchase of
the center by General Motors to be used as its headquarters, as well
as other similar investments of corporations looking to move from
the suburbs back into downtown, could possibly be a part of the
revitalization the Henry Ford II envisioned.57
As the Renaissance Center suggests, Detroit has been attempting
to move its economy away from manufacturing and towards an
economy of consumption.58 To encourage a consumer economy,
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Detroit has built several casinos, which hope to draw tourists and
residents alike.59 The idea behind a casino and entertainmentbased economy is that casinos are a relatively easy and cheap way to
circulate money, and are relatively inexpensive to run, since most
employees earn low wages.60 Proponents of the casino strategy argue
that casinos allow the city to become a magnet for tourism, which
then creates demand for more hotels, restaurants and entertainment
complexes, eventually revitalizing downtown.61 In November 1996,
Michigan voters approved of Proposal E, which authorized the
construction of a maximum of three casinos in downtown Detroit.62
The first permanent casino built was MGM Grand, which took over
several city blocks and included a hotel and a large shopping center
and restaurant complex.63 Later came the Motor City Casino, which
took over an abandoned Wonder Bread factory, with 75,000 square
feet of gambling and entertainment space.64 Finally in 2000, the
Greektown casino opened with its own hotel, theater and convention
spaces.65 The casino initiative has met varied success, with many
arguing that it has not revitalized downtown Detroit enough, while
some argue that it has impacted some renewal and will continue to in
the future.
The success of the casino initiative is still highly debated. In 2006,
Detroit had the sixth highest annual revenue of casino markets in
the United States, with revenue of over a billion dollars.66 However,
there are several problems with the casino and entertainment based
economy that Detroit hopes to become. Firstly, this kind of success
can only be expected in times of economic prosperity. Second, these
casinos are making profit from the residents of Detroit, who are as a
whole impoverished.67 The relative success of the casino initiative,
and the ability of the casinos to revitalize the city depend on the
individual casino. The Greektown casino has been identified as
probably the most successful in affecting the urban form around
it.68 This success is due to the plan and structure of the casino itself.
This is for a multitude of reasons, first of which is because the
parking is located over a block from the actual casino, forcing patrons
to walk through at least a small portion of the city.69 Also, all the
restaurants are separate from the gambling areas and are also open
at the street level.70 Lastly, there are several entrances and exits
throughout the casino, which encourages patrons to go back and
forth between the city and the casino itself.71 All of these
unconventional designs allow for a positive synergy between the
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casino and its neighborhood. Although casinos have the detriment
of being susceptible to economic ups and downs, if more casinos are
designed to interact with its neighborhood, they have the opportunity
to truly revitalize Detroit.
The economic issues facing Hartford are different from those
facing Detroit. Hartford has a relatively strong economy, centered on
insurance and other high skill industries. The issue with Hartford’s
economy is its high levels of segregation; commuters fill over 83%
of the 121,000 jobs, while 65% of the residents of Hartford commute
outside the city for employment.72 Instead of trying to bring a whole
new economy to the city, like in Detroit, the goal of Hartford’s urban
renewal strategies is to revitalize its downtown into a 24-hour hub,
rather than just a 9 to 5 city. The primary force behind this effort is the
Capital Region Development Authority, whose mission is, among other
things to “to stimulate economic development and new investment in
and around Hartford, develop and redevelop property to attract and
retain businesses, and rebrand and promote the district.”73 The Capital
Region Development Authority is responsible for a multitude of
renewal projects in Hartford, namely the Connecticut Convention
Center, XL Center, Adriaen’s Landing and the Front Street District.74
One of the most expansive of these projects is the Front Street
District, which has the potential to catalyze the revitalization of
downtown Hartford.
The site of the Front Street District had been in the works
for decades. In 1988, New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft
announced that Hartford would be the new home for the football
team, however soon after these plans fell through.75 Regardless, the
city and state governments of Hartford and Connecticut repurposed
the land intended for use as the football stadium.76 Although the area
lay dormant for some time, the Front Street District Area now is
filled with restaurants, theaters, and residential areas.77 In addition,
the University of Connecticut has plans to open a campus in 2017,
which will be designed to intertwine with the city and have synergy
with the nearby Hartford Public Library, Wadsworth Athenaeum,
Connecticut Science Center and government buildings.78 The
Front Street project also includes The Front Street Lofts, which will
include 121 apartments with high-end amenities, located in close
proximity to the restaurant and entertainment district, along with
the University of Connecticut campus.79 Between the entertainment
space, university campus, and apartment complex, it is likely that
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the Front Street District in downtown Hartford will be successful, just
how successful though, remains to be seen.
The Urban Renewal of Hartford and Detroit: What Works and
What Doesn’t?
There is quite a bit of similarity in the strategies that Hartford
and Detroit have taken to revitalize their downtowns. Though on
a different scale, which is expected given the differing sizes of the
two cities, both Detroit and Hartford have attempted to draw more
people into their downtown through the creation of entertainment
hubs. In addition, though both cities had the goal of renewing their
downtown, the problems plaguing each city were slightly different,
therefore producing slightly different goals. For example, Detroit’s
goal in building the casinos was to spur a tourist and entertainmentbased economy for the city. Contrastingly, Hartford did not necessarily
have the goal of creating another economy for the city, as insurance
and other similar sectors of the economy are still strong. Instead,
Hartford was more interested in becoming a 24-hour downtown,
where people both work and live, instead of the commuter-heavy
downtown that now exists. Because these renewal strategies are
still in progress, both in Hartford and in Detroit, there is no
determination of total success or failure. However, some projects have
more of a potential to, or have already had success, in renewing their
downtown.
The Renaissance Center and The Front Street District both
attempted to bring people back from the suburbs into downtown.
However, the Renaissance Center was largely considered a failure
of urban renewal because it felt disconnected from the space around
it, and failed to produce an integrated experience that encouraged
visitors to experience the whole of downtown instead of just the
center itself. In contrast, The Front Street District is an integrated
and multi-dimensional project that includes both entertainment
and residential space, which encourage people to both visit and
live. It is likely that had the Renaissance Center included the
residential dimension that was originally planned, the project would
have been much more successful in revitalizing the area. Arguably
the most successful casino in renewing the neighborhood around
it is the Greektown Casino, which is designed to encourage visitors
to interact with the outside as well. Though the Front Street
District is still in still in progress, it is likely that because it includes
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both residential and entertainment space, as well as a university
campus, all of which interact organically with the city around it, the
project will be successful in helping to renew downtown Hartford.
Overall, drawing upon the urban renewal case studies in Hartford
and Detroit, it is clear that the most successful urban renewal
strategies encourage both tourists and residents to interact organically
with the city around them.
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